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SUBSIDIARITY AND THE PUBLIC–





Investment treaty arbitration is a form of international dispute settlement. It 
allows foreign investors to bring claims against sovereign states that host their 
investment on the basis of an alleged breach of those sovereign states’ 
commitments regarding foreign investment in their territory. If the state has 
promised, for example, to extend fair and equitable treatment to the investor, 
and the state does not keep this commitment, the foreign investor has standing 
to bring a claim against the state before an arbitration tribunal and seek 
financial reparation for damages. 
Host states often comply with (or breach) their international obligations 
toward foreign investors through local decisions and regulations. For instance, 
states expropriate a foreign investment through local decisions. Therefore, in 
deciding investment disputes, arbitrators often have to scrutinize the behavior 
of host states and pass judgment on their local decision-making process. 
Investment arbitration involves two levels of decisionmaking: (1) an 
international level, where international investment arbitrators assess the 
behavior of sovereign states on the basis of international law; and (2) a local 
level, where sovereign states adopt decisions regarding foreign investors, which 
can in turn be assessed by the international investment tribunals.1 
Because of its two-level architecture, investment arbitration requires some 
kind of organizing principle for allocating authority along its vertical axis; that 
is, it demands a criterion for choosing whether certain issues should be decided 
at the national or international level. The principle of subsidiarity is one such 
criterion. As put forward in the introduction to this issue, the principle of 
subsidiarity requires decisionmaking to occur at lower levels, unless good 
reasons exist to shift it upward.2 Certain international legal regimes, such as the 
Inter-American regime of human rights or the law of the European Union 
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(EU), expressly provide for subsidiarity as an overarching organizing principle 
of the interaction between the domestic and international levels. Investment 
arbitration, in contrast, includes subsidiarity in a much less straightforward 
fashion. The international investment regime (the law that creates the rights 
and duties of foreign investors and gives jurisdiction to courts and investment 
tribunals to enforce them) contains no express reference to subsidiarity, or any 
other such principle, as an organizing tool for the interaction between the 
international and domestic levels.3 As a result, the question of subsidiarity 
emerges in investment arbitration in a much less stark fashion than occurs in 
human rights or EU law, for example. Thus, subsidiarity is seldom a formal 
obstacle for the exercise of jurisdiction by investment tribunals.4 Instead, it 
emerges as a question of deference. Though the investment regime gives 
arbitration tribunals the jurisdiction to assess local decisions that affect foreign 
investments, the degree of deference (if any) that such tribunals should give to 
local decisionmakers remains an open question. 
Against this backdrop, this article argues that the vertical allocation of 
authority has become a space where contrasting views of investment arbitration 
as a whole are projected. Subsidiarity in investment arbitration reflects the 
public–private distinction that permeates most contemporary readings of 
investment arbitration. Specifically, demand for subsidiarity is a function of the 
public–private distinction: a private reading of investment arbitration entails a 
lower demand for subsidiarity (that is, it demands with less intensity that 
decisionmaking occurs at a lower level), whereas a public reading of investment 
arbitration entails a higher demand for subsidiarity (requiring with more 
intensity that decisionmaking occurs a lower level). 
Each mindset justifies its choice between levels of authority in terms of its 
own representation of the external pressures faced by the investment regime. 
For the public mindset, a central challenge to the investment regime is its lack 
of democratic legitimacy as an exercise of public power. Faced with this 
pressure, the public mindset features subsidiarity as an answer because scaling 
down the level of authority might bridge the investment regime’s legitimacy gap 
by reconstituting the democratic credentials of the decisionmaker. In contrast, 
for the private mindset, the regime’s challenges emerge from its failure to fulfill 
its function of creating legal certainty for investment; thus, scaling up 
decisionmaking could enhance the possibilities of a predictable, nonpolitical 
regulatory environment. In this context, the vertical allocation of authority, 
derived as it is from the public–private divide, works in investment arbitration 
as a pressure-relief valve. The valve allows the investment regime to react to the 
 
 3. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: 
The Standard of Review in Investor–State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 297 (2010) (explaining 
that, regarding domestic regulations, “ICSID tribunals have, as yet, failed to develop a coherent 
jurisprudential approach or consistent standard of review”). 
 4.  The exhaustion of local remedies is not required in contemporary investment arbitration. See 
Christoph Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration, 4 
LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 1 (2005). 
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external criticism by shifting authority down to the local level or by scaling it up 
to the international level, thus accounting for deep change while remaining 
overall stable. 
This shifting vertical allocation of authority in investment arbitration can be 
mapped onto Jachtenfuchs and Krisch’s conjectures regarding the demand and 
supply for subsidiarity in global governance. Their introductory article posits 
that demand for subsidiarity might be higher when acts of global governance 
institutions “are highly intrusive and concern specific cases.”5 As this article 
explains, this intuition proves to be right in the case of investment arbitration, 
but it has been permeated by wider debates of global governance, particularly 
the public–private divide in governance. Investment arbitration provides a rich 
illustration of the pathways through which demand for subsidiarity is 
implemented and the shifting ways a wider understanding of governance affects 
the demand for subsidiarity in a particular context. Ultimately, the investment 
arbitration case underscores the importance of the public–private distinction for 
the overall discussion of subsidiarity in global governance. 
Moreover, on the supply side of the equation, Jachtenfuchs and Krisch 
suggest that subsidiarity will be more present in regimes that deal with issues 
without international repercussions and less so in institutions regulating actual 
or potential negative externalities.6 This suggestion is partially confirmed by the 
investment regime: subsidiarity is likely to appear in the private mindset of 
arbitration, which conceives of investment protection as a transnational 
concern. The article’s conjecture, though, is not confirmed by the public 
mindset of arbitration, which also considers investment protection as a 
transnational issue, affecting global public goods and yet calling for subsidiarity 
on precisely such grounds. 
This article focuses on cases emerging from the Argentinean crisis in 2001 
and proceeds in the following way: Part II introduces the vertical allocation of 
authority (that is, scaling authority up or down) in international investment 
arbitration and traces the role of subsidiarity therein. Part III explores the 
public–private division in investment arbitration. Then, part IV, which is the 
core of the contribution, explains how the subsidiarity and the vertical 
allocation of authority in investment treaty arbitration are a function of the 
public–private distinction. Part V concludes by suggesting that the choice of 
allocating authority at a specific level is not the result of the inherent 
characteristics of the investment regime, but is rather a device to maintain the 
stability of the system. The shifting of authority works as a pressure-relief valve, 
through which the regime is able to react to discontent. When the legitimacy of 
the investment system is questioned, the vertical allocation of authority 
operates as a mechanism of marginal adjustment, shifting authority from one 
level of governance to the other in order to enhance the system’s legitimacy. 
 
 5.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 15. 
 6.  Id. at 16. 
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II 
SUBSIDIARITY AND THE VERTICAL ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
An international investment agreement (IIA) is a treaty between two or 
more states establishing rules that govern investments by their respective 
nationals in the other’s territory. These rules are enforced through exceptional 
mechanisms of adjudication. Investment agreements usually grant jurisdiction 
to arbitration tribunals over disputes between private investors and the host 
state, giving investors standing before such international tribunals. 
As a form of dispute settlement, investment arbitration is not much different 
from other forms of adjudication, with the important exception that a private 
party, the investor, is given standing to initiate proceedings against a sovereign 
state that would otherwise be immune in the local courts of most foreign states. 
Investment arbitration, however, is much more than just a dispute-settlement 
mechanism. It is a technology of global governance, in which an international 
institution exercises power with a direct impact on individuals beyond the 
parties to the investment dispute. As suggested in the introduction to this issue, 
such intense impact on local politics triggers a high demand for subsidiarity.7 
Investment arbitration operates as a form of global governance, affecting 
local decisionmaking, in at least three ways. 
First, investment arbitration often reviews domestic regulation for possible 
violations of standards contained in the treaty. For example, a local regulation 
may be tantamount to expropriation of a foreign investment, and the 
investment tribunal may order compensation to the investor. Thus, even if the 
arbitral tribunal has no formal power to strike down local regulations, in effect 
the tribunal engages in review of the regulations (including domestic judicial 
decisions), assessing them against the standards mandated by the treaty. As a 
consequence of such review, host states may decide to strike down their own 
regulations or may be deterred from adopting a certain line of regulations—a 
phenomenon that has been referred to as a “chilling effect” of investment 
arbitration. 
Second, investment arbitration tribunals contribute to the definition of 
appropriate standards of domestic governance, particularly in their influence on 
domestic administrative laws and procedures. Especially through the fair and 
equitable treatment standards (though not restricted to them), investment 
tribunals review domestic administrative processes and may have an influence 
on the framing and application of such local procedures. To assess awards, 
arbitration tribunals have established standards applicable to stability, 
predictability, and consistency of the legal framework; the protection of 




 7.  See id. at 15. 
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requirement of reasonableness and proportionality in domestic administrative 
proceedings,8 all of which have an impact in structures of domestic governance. 
Finally, international investment arbitration may be subject to domestic 
legal review. Up to now, this article has explained that investment arbitration 
involves tribunals deciding whether a host state has violated the standards of an 
IIA. This is typically a “top-down” process in which the international authority 
exercises jurisdiction over the local level of decisionmaking. However, 
investment arbitration also involves a “bottom-up” exercise of authority that is 
correspondingly read through the public–private lenses. Domestic courts may 
also be given jurisdiction to decide whether investment arbitration awards (that 
is, the decisions adopted by international investment tribunals) should be 
subject to domestic judicial review. In this dimension, it is a matter of the 
domestic arbitral law of the site of the arbitration to establish the possibility of 
judicial review and its characteristics9 and of the procedural rules of the 
arbitration. Thus, crucial considerations are whether a domestic court will have 
the jurisdiction to review such awards, and how strict its analysis will be. 
Given these characteristics, investment arbitration is not only a dispute-
settlement mechanism but also a veritable exercise of global governance, which 
can be compared with other global regulatory regimes.10 Investment arbitration 
involves at least two levels of decisionmaking in which an international 
institution (an investment arbitration tribunal) is empowered to adopt decisions 
that affect the national or subnational level of governance. Investment 
arbitration is an area of governance where the demand for and supply of 
subsidiarity, as put forward in this issue’s introduction, can be fruitfully 
discussed. States that shape the regime, in close conversation with private 
interests potentially benefited by such a move, agree to scale up the authority to 
adopt decisions related to foreign investment protection (in particular, 
adjudication of investment claims), thus effectively creating a multilevel 
structure of governance. 
But investment arbitration is not governed by an express principle of 
interaction between levels of governance. Despite the multilevel structure they 
create, IIAs are typically silent with regard to the framing of interaction. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that some IIAs include certain rules concerning 
exhaustion of local remedies,11 in most cases arbitration tribunals get little 
 
 8.  See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor–State Arbitration as Governance: 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, (N.Y. 
Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 146, 2009), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_ 
plltwp/146.  
 9.  See, e.g., Veijo Heiskanen, Matthias Scherer & Sam Moss, Domestic Review of Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations: The Swiss Experience, 27 ASA BULL. 256, 256–79 (2009). 
 10.  See, e.g., Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 148–50 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, The Global 
Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 701 (2005); 
Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 8, at 41. 
 11.  See generally Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella 
Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 231–56 (2004) (explaining that the tribunals 
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guidance from investment protection treaties as to the relative importance of 
domestic decisions in the international tribunal’s decisionmaking. As a result, 
given the formal absence of a principle of subsidiarity, this pondering of the 
relative authority of domestic decisions is framed as a problem of deference. 
Thus, investment tribunals might decide to be deferential to domestic 
decisionmakers, thus applying in practice the principle of subsidiarity (in which 
power is pushed to the lower level of decisionmaking), or they may decide not 
to be deferential at all, thus maintaining the decision-making power at the 
international level. 
In the absence of an overarching principle of subsidiarity, the international 
investment regime implies a double process of vertical allocation authority. 
First, the legal framework of the IIA scales up decision-making authority to the 
investment tribunal, granting the power to an international authority to 
essentially review domestic decisions on the basis of the criteria set forth in the 
treaty. And, once exercising its jurisdiction, the investment tribunal assesses the 
relative persuasiveness of a domestic decision, deciding whether the decision-
making power should remain at the international level—if it finds that the 
domestic decision is not persuasive—or whether authority can be scaled down 
to the national level—if it finds that the domestic decision is persuasive. 
Investment arbitration is, in this sense, a regime of governance with a vertical 
allocation of authority that is simultaneously stable and in constant flux. 
Although a formal allocation of authority gives the investment tribunal 
jurisdiction over a domestic decision, the same formal allocation of power 
allows for shifting authority along the vertical scale. 
When do investment tribunals decide to be more deferential, thus applying 
in practice a stronger principle of subsidiarity? For Jachtenfuchs and Krisch’s 
conjecture regarding the demand for subsidiarity in global governance, 
investment arbitration should be a case where the demand for subsidiarity is 
high, because it is a form of authority that directly impacts local governance.12 
The investment case, however, is a much more dynamic process of vertical 
allocation of authority. Authority is sometimes pushed downward to the 
national sphere, but it also sometimes remains at the international level. This 
process can be better understood in reference to the public–private divide that 
characterizes the contemporary understanding of investment arbitration, as is 
explored in the following two parts. 
III 
THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVISION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
Investment arbitration tribunals embody a form of hybrid dispute 
settlement with important implications in terms of global governance. This 
hybrid characteristic has created debate among investment law scholars, 
 
are guided by certain parameters defined by BITs).  
 12.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 15. 
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concerning the “private” or “public” nature of the investment regime. Such 
characterization will have, in turn, an impact on the overarching vertical 
allocation of authority, particularly the demand for a principle of subsidiarity. 
This part introduces the public–private divide in investment arbitration, while 
the next connects the divide with subsidiarity. 
The public–private division in investment arbitration can be defined in 
reference to four variables: (1) the legal regime applicable in investment 
arbitration; (2) the actors involved in the dispute; (3) the function that 
investment arbitration fulfills; and, finally, (4) the issues dealt with by the 
decision of the investment award and their overall impact. 
Legal Regime. Investment arbitration is established on the basis of a public-
law instrument (a treaty) concluded between sovereign states. Its basic legal 
architecture is that states limit their sovereignty and instead accept the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to adjudicate possible violations of such 
limits. The arbitral tribunal’s sources are mostly public-law sources,13 not 
private-law instruments.14 In its basic legal structure, then, investment 
arbitration resembles the international human rights regime. However, the 
procedure of investment arbitration has a private origin, which is reflected in 
the overall idea that there should be an equivalence of means between the state 
and the investor as disputing parties. The rules of arbitration that are followed 
were, for the most part, originally designed for resolving disputes between 
private parties and are still characterized by the overall need for confidentiality 
and the role of the disputing parties as “masters of the arbitration.”15 
Investment arbitration is a procedural regime created with private disputes 
in mind that is now used for adjudicating on the basis of public-law instruments. 
This dual nature derives from the early origins of the overall investment regime, 
in which developing countries in dire need for foreign capital sought to assure 
capital exporting countries that their investments would be safe. This assurance 
required, on the one hand, a credible legal embodiment that would effectively 
bind the capital importing country. This legal obligation could derive only from 
public-law obligations adopted by the capital importing state, which would 
effectively limit the state’s sovereign power in its treatment of investors present 
in its territory. But traditional public international law had no adjudicative 
procedure to enforce these kinds of legal obligations when the beneficiaries 
were private parties. Thus, the procedures of arbitration between private actors 
and their rule of party equality were used as a template for investment 




 13.  ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 39–133 (2009). 
 14.  See Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID 
Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835–51 (2005). 
 15.  Rolf Trittmann, When Should Arbitrators Issue Interim or Partial Awards and or Procedural 
Orders?, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 255, 262 (2003).  
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treated as equals to private parties, even when the former adopted decisions for 
the general interest of their own communities.16 
Actors. Actors involved in arbitration procedures also play a role in the 
construction of the public–private distinction. For analytical purposes, the 
disputing parties can be discussed separately from the arbitrators. Investment 
arbitration involves a private actor, the investor, and it also involves a sovereign 
state, the quintessential public entity. Arbitrators comprise the second group of 
actors involved in investment arbitration. In this regard, the distinction of 
public–private also emerges. Arbitrators are normally appointed by the 
disputing parties and emerge from two different “epistemic communities.”17 On 
the one hand, there are international public law scholars and practitioners with 
experience in litigating and solving inter-state disputes, and on the other hand, 
there are arbitrators who emerge from the community of international 
commercial arbitration. These two epistemic communities are likely to clash 
because they have different audiences and perspectives of the role of law, the 
state, and the function of arbitration.18 
Function. Investment arbitration has an ambivalent function in global 
governance. On the one hand, it ostensibly seeks to solve a dispute between a 
private party and a host state. In that sense, it is not that different from 
international commercial arbitration, with the (possibly marginal) difference of 
having as defendant a sovereign state. However, in order to solve such a 
dispute, investment tribunals often fulfill a function that comes close to judicial 
review. When exercising their jurisdiction and determining possible 
responsibility of a host state, investment tribunals regularly assess domestic 
regulations against international standards of treatment. This process of review 
can be characterized as public in the sense that it implies a review of domestic 
regulation that is itself public. Investment arbitration is, therefore, hybrid in its 
function: although it is a dispute-settlement mechanism involving a foreign 
investor, it also acts as a judicial institution of review of domestic acts. 
Issues.  Finally, the public–private division of investment arbitration is also 
built in reference to the issues that are involved in the arbitration and the 
overall impact of the decisions. Investment arbitration is not solely a dispute-
settlement mechanism; it has wider impacts on the domestic context of the 
investment subject to the dispute and on the overall global regulatory 
 
 16.  On the origins of the investment regimes, see generally KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 
(2013). Miles’s account differs from the one presented here by focusing on the substantive obligations 
of the regime (rather than on the specific form of arbitration), and, following Tony Anghie’s work, links 
such obligations to the colonial heritage of international law. For an example of Tony Anghie’s work, 
see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005). 
 17.  See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992). 
 18.  Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International 
Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875, 888 (2011); see also Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: 
Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 54–55 (2013).  
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landscape. These wider impacts have been interpreted along a public–private 
dichotomy.19 From this perspective, investment arbitration not only acts as a 
private dispute resolution mechanism, but it also implies an exercise of public 
authority by impacting local governance in at least the three ways referred to 
earlier. The issues that are dealt with in investment arbitration also contribute 
to its hybrid character. Arbitration is typically triggered by a claim on the basis 
of a foreign investment, which defines a private framework for the controversy. 
However, investment controversies often involve the exercise of public power 
by the host state, which enter into conflict with the solely private nature of the 
investment controversy. Moreover, investment arbitration awards can have a 
wider impact on the protection of public values, such as human rights20 or the 
environment21: a domestic decision protecting those values could be hindered or 
encouraged by signals from investment arbitration tribunals. Despite the 
apparently private nature of the dispute, investment arbitration easily shifts 
toward the public domain of governance. 
The hybrid nature of the investment regime opens the space for two 
competing mindsets of investment arbitration: a public mindset, emphasizing 
the public aspects of each characterizing trait of investment arbitration, and a 
private mindset, emphasizing the private aspects of the system. The contrast 
between these views is at the heart of the public–private divide in contemporary 
readings of investment arbitration, and their contrasting views, in turn, define 
the demand for subsidiarity in this structure of governance. 
IV 
SUBSIDIARITY AS A FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The public–private divide is an important aspect in defining the demand for 
and supply of subsidiarity in investment arbitration. This connection emerges 
indirectly because the question of subsidiarity is not expressly present in the 
investment regime. However, as discussed above, it does emerge in the form of 
deference. Should international investment tribunals defer to domestic 
decisionmakers? Should domestic courts defer to international investment 
tribunals? This discussion is framed by specialists in investment arbitration as a 
problem of the standard of review.22 This part briefly introduces the concept of 
standard of review, and then shows how its use in investment arbitration closely 
mirrors the public–private divide explored earlier. 
 
 
 19.  See VAN HARTEN, supra note 1, at 45–71; Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International 
Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law 
Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 71–84 (2011).  
 20.  See Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L 
COMP. L.Q. 573–96 (2011). 
 21.  See MILES, supra note 16, at 154–209. 
 22.  See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 283–345. 
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A standard of review refers to the level of scrutiny that an adjudicator 
applies when reviewing the decision—for example, an investment arbitration 
award—of a lower court or of another institution. The notion comes from 
domestic judicial review and is inspired by the appropriate balance of powers 
between high courts, lower courts, and institutions in other branches of power.23 
Put simply, a standard of review sets the questions that will be asked of the 
primary decision. Thus, in domestic law, standards of review are often pictured 
along a continuum, with completely new review of the primary decision on one 
end and complete deference to that decision on the other.24 Thus, when 
engaging in judicial review, a court has the option of applying a very strict level 
of scrutiny, considering and deciding the legal question anew—in effect 
substituting the primary decisionmaker via judicial review. Alternatively, in the 
other extreme, the reviewing court has the option of adopting a highly 
deferential standard, under which it will give more weight to the primary 
decisionmaker. 
In domestic systems, deciding the applicable standard of review gravitates 
around the specific reason for the review. A certain argument against the 
primary decision will entail a particular standard of review. For example, a legal 
decision of the primary decisionmaker will most likely be reviewed de novo; 
that is, the reviewing court will decide the legal issue without affording the 
lower court deference.25 In contrast, other arguments against the primary 
decision will warrant a more deferential standard of review. For example, 
challenges on the basis of factual errors will most likely trigger a standard of 
review in which the presiding court will only look for ostensibly erroneous 
interpretation of fact by the primary decisionmaker.26 Short of that, the court 
will show deference to the primary decisionmaker. 
In international law, the question of standards of review has taken on 
specific characteristics of its own. International courts are often reviewing not a 
decision by a lower court, but rather the decision of one of the parties to the 
litigation—often, a state. Consequently, the issue of standard of review involves 
pondering the legitimate policy space of states, which risks being unduly 
restricted. Should international courts be deferential to the decisions of 
domestic institutions or, on the contrary, should they engage in de novo review 
of primary decisions? Exceptionally, in certain specialized regimes, the 
language contained in the relevant treaty answers this question. Such is the case 
of dumping litigation at the World Trade Organization (WTO), for which the 
Article 17.6 Anti-Dumping Agreement provides a specific standard of review in 
anti-dumping proceedings.27 That is, however, the exception. In most 
 
 23.  Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233, 236–41 (2009).  
 24.  For a discussion of the standard of review in U.S. law, see generally Ronald R. Hofer, 
Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231–51 (1991).  
 25.  Peters, supra note 23, at 246. 
 26.  Id. at 245. 
 27.  Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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international legal regimes, the question of standard of review is left open for 
the relevant court to decide. 
Two sources of analytical tools have been developed in international law to 
that effect. First, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article XX 
permits certain exceptional trade-restrictive measures to be adopted in order to 
protect public goals such as morality, security, or the environment.28 Such 
exceptional measures must be necessary to achieve the stated goal. Thus, when 
deciding whether the measure is truly necessary, the WTO panel and Appellate 
Body have developed a consistent body of case law that assesses whether the 
state has taken the least restrictive measure reasonably available that meets its 
permissible objective under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article 
XX. To meet this standard, the defendant state must make a prima facie 
argument that the exceptional measure was necessary in its context. In that 
case, the panel or Appellate Body will have a deferential attitude toward the 
primary decisionmaker. Then the burden of proof shifts to the complainant, 
who must prove that the measure is unnecessary (mainly by proving the 
reasonable availability of a less trade-restrictive alternative measure).29 
The European Court of Human Rights, in turn, has developed the second 
important analytical tool in defining the level of scrutiny to be applied when 
assessing reviewing domestic measures: the “margin of appreciation” doctrine.30 
The doctrine refers to the “‘breadth of deference’ that the Court is willing to 
grant to the decisions of national legislative, executive, and judicial 
decisionmakers.”31 The margin of appreciation is a form of standard of review 
under which an international court gives weight to the reasoning of the primary 
decisionmaker for reasons of democratic legitimacy, common practice of the 
states, or expertise.32 
Investment law has not adopted a specific standard of review. A mix of 
different standards applies in an uneven fashion.33 These variable standards of 
review can be read as a function of the public–private division of investment 
arbitration. As was discussed above, international investment arbitration can be 
classified as public or private because its actors, legal structure, and other 
dimensions feature characteristics of both. How the arbitration is classified 
 
1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.  
 28.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-20, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  
 29.  On the standard of review in the WTO, see generally Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in 
WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635–59 (2003).  
 30.  For an introduction to the doctrine, see ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 38–66 (Vaughan Lowe 
ed., 1st ed. 2012).  
 31.  Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 305. 
 32.  LEGG, supra note 30, at 17. 
 33.  See generally Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The 
Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor–State Arbitration, 4 J. INT’L 
DISP. SETTLEMENT 197–215 (2013); Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to 
Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor–State Arbitration, 
15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 223–55 (2012). 
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affects the way the standard of review is exercised and, therefore, the demand 
for subsidiarity in investment arbitration. 
In general terms, a public-law mindset favors allocating authority at the 
domestic level. Those with this mindset prefer a deferential standard when 
investment tribunals review domestic decisions but favor a nondeferential 
standard when domestic courts review investment awards. In contrast, tribunals 
and scholars with a private-law mindset favors allocating authority at the 
international level. They prefer a nondeferential standard for investment 
tribunals and a deferential standard for domestic courts. 
On what grounds is the decision to allocate authority at a certain level 
adopted?  The demand for subsidiarity as a function of the public–private 
divide creates a mechanism to maintain the stability of the system by allowing 
authority to be scaled up and down. Each mindset (public or private) justifies its 
choice between levels of authority in terms of its own representation of the 
external pressures faced by the investment regime. The shifting standard of 
review (and the implicit shifting demand for subsidiarity) works as a pressure-
relief valve through which the regime can react to criticism or discontent. For 
the public mindset, a central challenge to the investment regime is its lack of 
legitimacy as an exercise of public power. Thus, the vertical allocation of 
authority creates a mechanism of marginal adjustment, shifting authority from 
one level of governance to the other, which could enhance the system’s 
legitimacy—in this case, by moving authority to the domestic level. In contrast, 
for the private mindset, the regime’s challenges emerge from its failure to fulfill 
its function of creating legal certainty for investment. In that case, the solution 
would be to move authority up the scale of governance by creating a centralized 
investment court or an appellate facility. Moving authority up and down 
permits this kind of adaptation without having to transform the deep structure 
of the system. The public–private distinction provides the appropriate rationale 
for shifting authority. Through that mechanism, the investment regime is able to 
maintain its stability while at the same time adapting to external environmental 
pressures. 
A. Standards of Review in a Private Mindset of Investment Arbitration 
Reading investment arbitration as a private issue reinforces the allocation of 
authority at the international level. This allocation may occur in two ways. First, 
the relevance of the standard of review can be denied as a whole. Although 
investment awards do not make this argument openly, the idea of judicial 
review (and, hence, of a standard of review) is completely foreign to 
international commercial arbitration.34 Adopting an extreme reading of 
investment arbitration as nothing different than international commercial 
arbitration would lead to denial of the relevance of standard of review in 
investment arbitration. As a result, under certain circumstances, the very 
 
 34.  Anthea Roberts, The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
16 INT’L COUNCIL COM. ARB. CONGRESS SERIES 170, 173 (2011). 
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possibility of giving weight to the reasoning of a domestic decisionmaker, and 
scaling down authority, is completely foreign. Under a purely commercial 
arbitration mindset, the standard-of-review question does not emerge. And the 
authority to decide remains at the international level, not because it is more 
appropriate in terms of review, but because the arbitral tribunal understands 
itself as a mere mechanism of dispute settlement. 
In practice, though, investment tribunals must often ponder domestic 
decisions and are thus presented with the need for a standard of review. In that 
case, the private mindset of investment arbitration entails giving very little 
deference to domestic decisionmakers. Although a standard of review is indeed 
applied, it is quite demanding, with little deference given to the principal 
decisionmaker. Contrary to what is predicted by the introduction to this issue, 
for a private mindset of investment arbitration the demand for subsidiarity will 
be low, even if the exercise of authority directly affects important concerns in 
local governance. This allocation of political power on a vertical axis is often 
explained as a function of political risk on the basis of the obsolescing bargain 
model (OBM).35 According to this model, foreign investors face an increased 
political risk when the investment is performed. As the cost of withdrawing the 
investment becomes higher (for example, as sunk costs increase), the risk of the 
original bargain becoming obsolete for the host state increases as well. The 
investor is therefore required to hedge such political risk. 
Political risk can be hedged through independent adjudication of claims 
against the host state. Local courts, however, may be perceived as unreliable for 
adjudicating these claims because they may lack independence from the 
authorities of the host state involved in the dispute. From the OBM perspective, 
it becomes necessary to scale up decisionmaking and empower an international 
institution (an international arbitration tribunal, for example) to adjudicate 
such claims. 
By scaling up, this model suggests, investment disputes become 
depoliticized. Local decisionmaking on contentions involving a host state and 
important investments is bound to be subject to political pressures. In contrast, 
in the early years of the bilateral investment treaty boom, the goal of bilateral 
investment treaties was to “insulate private investment from politically driven 
foreign or domestic public policy—in effect, to depoliticize investment matters 
 
 35.  See generally RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD 
OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971). For its role as the underlying rationale for the investment regime, see 
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 277 (2011). The OBM has since been questioned on a couple of fronts: (a) multinational 
corporations often do not negotiate entry conditions with the host state, but rather engage in a 
permanent process of updating investment environment, and (b) certain bargains fail to become 
obsolete because the threat of withdrawing the investment remains credible. See Lorraine Eden, 
Stefanie Lenway & Douglas A. Schuler, From the Obsolescing Bargain to the Political Bargaining 
Model, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 251–72 
(Robert Grosse ed.). This critique, though, has not proved influential in foreign investment law. I thank 
Nicolás Perrone, whose PhD thesis explores the relevance of the OBM in foreign investment law, for 
pointing this literature out to me. 
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by placing the protection of private investment under an apolitical legal 
regime.”36 
The OBM model is a fundamentally private mindset. It provides a rationale 
for allocating authority focused on private concerns: moving the decision-
making power to the international level is a way of solving the private political 
risk of private investors. Host states may decide to accept this bargain for 
multiple reasons (attracting foreign investment,37 reducing the cost of capital,38 
or, in the case of least developed countries, securing a competitive advantage 
over other similarly situated countries).39 Regardless of the reason for accepting, 
when the private interest of the investor is understood to be the dominant 
concern in a bilateral investment treaty, the idea of scaling up authority 
becomes a necessary part of the overall package. There is, in this sense, a 
connection between the private nature of the interests that are being protected 
and the low demand for subsidiarity in investment arbitration. 
The awards in the Argentinean gas cases (CMS,40 Enron,41 and Sempra42) 
provide a good example of the connection between a private rationale of 
investment arbitration, a demanding standard of review, and the low demand 
for subsidiarity—evidencing an extremely nondeferential approach to reviewing 
domestic decisions.43 The origin of these cases was the Argentinean economic 
emergency in 2001, when the Argentinean peso, unpegged from the U.S. dollar, 
was devaluated. Moreover, utilities tariffs were frozen, and several restrictions 
on capital were imposed (including limits to bank withdrawals and to the 
transfer of funds abroad). Several foreign investors had planned their revenue 
on the basis of a pegged currency, particularly in the public-utilities sector. 
Investors in the gas sector were particularly affected by the crisis. CMS, Enron, 
and Sempra were all American corporations invested in this sector: CMS had 
bought an important part of TGN, a gas transportation company that operated 
under a license that provided for a system of calculating tariffs in dollars (not 
pesos), while Enron had invested in government-issued licenses to transport 
natural gas and Sempra in licenses to distribute it, all with a similar financial 
 
 36.  Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L 
TAX & BUS. L. 159, 160 (1993).  
 37.  Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 822–23 (2006). 
 38.  Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing 
and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 632 (2005). 
 39.  Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 670 (1997). For a discussion opposing this view, see 
ALVAREZ, supra note 35, at 181–295.  
 40.  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 
12, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf. 
 41.  Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award (May 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf. 
 42.  Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 
2007), http://www.italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf. 
 43.  See generally Henckels, supra note 33, at 203 (arguing that the CMS, Enron, and Sempra 
decisions are “well known for their stringent scrutiny of Argentina’s emergency measures”). 
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structure. When the Argentinean government decided to eliminate the peso–
dollar parity, all debts denominated in dollars were converted on a 1:1 ratio to 
pesos. The peso devaluated, however, bringing significant losses to CMS, 
Enron, and Sempra. In response, each corporation filed against Argentina, 
claiming, among other things, expropriation and violation of the fair-and-
equitable-treatment standard. 
One of the crucial issues in the dispute was Argentina’s defense of necessity. 
The investment treaty between Argentina and the United States provided for a 
nonprecluded measures (NPM) clause, which stated that “it shall not preclude 
the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of 
public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
essential security interests.”44 Argentina argued that its economic measures 
were necessary to maintain its national interests. Among several arguments, 
Argentina argued that the necessity clause was self-judging; that the clause fell 
upon Argentina to decide whether the measures could be undertaken under 
that clause. The tribunal rejected the argument, finding that the necessity 
clauses were not self-judging and, rather, that it had jurisdiction to decide 
whether the clauses could be invoked.45 From this perspective, decision-making 
authority under the clause should remain at the international level. The 
tribunal, therefore, engaged in a substantive review of the measures, discussing 
in detail whether the financial situation in Argentina actually risked “total 
economic collapse”46 or threatened the “very existence of the state and its 
independence.”47 Moreover, the tribunal discussed whether the measure was 
really necessary, or whether Argentina had a different alternative to deal with 
its massive crisis. Here again, the tribunal adopted a nondeferential standard, 
and without specifying the actual alternatives available to Argentina, the 
arbitrators decided that the measures were not the only means available to react 
to the crisis.48 
This line of argument is intimately linked with the OBM rationale for 
investment arbitration. José Alvarez was an expert witness for the claimants in 
the Argentinean cases, and he defended the non-self-judging character of the 
NPM clause.49 For Alvarez, there was no treaty-based argument to justify the 
self-judging nature of the clause, nor should there be. According to Alvarez, the 
treaty itself did not justify the claim for deference to the domestic 
 
 44.  Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.–U.S., 
art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-2 (1993). 
 45.  Sempra, ¶ 385, 391; Enron, ¶ 332; CMS, ¶ 373. 
 46.  CMS, ¶ 322.  
 47.  Sempra, ¶ 348; Enron, ¶ 306.  
 48.  Sempra, ¶ 350; Enron, ¶ 308; CMS, ¶¶ 323–324. Argentina requested that the tribunals 
indicate what alternative measures were available, but the Enron and Sempra tribunals stated such line 
of inquiry would be outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Sempra, ¶ 351; Enron, ¶ 309. 
 49.  Sempra, Opinion of José Alvarez, ¶ 11 (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default 
/files/case-documents/ita0994.pdf. 
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decisionmaker,50 and it should not have recognized such a defense. For him, 
there was no normative reason for defending a deferential standard of review 
because the system established by the treaty was explicitly designed for allowing 
investors to forego national courts.51 In order to preserve the stability of the 
investment bargain and a credible investment environment, an investment 
arbitrator should (and indeed must) second-guess the motivations of domestic 
courts.52 
B. Bottom Up: Domestic Judicial Review of Investment Awards 
The private mindset is also reflected in the allocation of authority by 
domestic courts when reviewing investment tribunals. When a domestic court 
sees an investment dispute as a primarily private controversy with a party that 
happens to be a state, that domestic court will be more deferential to the 
primary decisionmaker—in this case, the arbitration tribunal. Such was the case 
in BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina.53 BG, a British investment 
company, had entered the gas sector in Argentina and was affected by the 
financial crisis and the Argentinean government’s emergency measures. 
BG filed a claim against Argentina under the Argentina–U.K. bilateral 
investment treaty. The treaty required the investor to first bring the complaint 
before a tribunal in Argentina for at least eighteen months. BG bypassed the 
Argentinian courts, however, and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral 
investment tribunal. BG did so because Argentina had issued a decree staying 
the execution of its courts’ final judgments in suits resulting from the new 
economic measures. Moreover, Argentina had undertaken to renegotiate 
certain service contracts (such as gas), but it had barred firms that were 
litigating against Argentina from that renegotiation. The arbitral investment 
tribunal, based in Washington, D.C., decided that Argentina’s changes to its 
judiciary excused the investor from exhausting the precondition to arbitration 
and awarded BG over $185 million in damages.54 
Both sides filed petitions for review in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia: BG Group demanded recognition and enforcement of the 
award (it was adopted under rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law), and Argentina sought to vacate the award. 
Argentina’s argument was that the eighteen-months requirement was a 
condition for its consent to arbitration. Because BG had not complied with the 
requirement, there was no consent for arbitration, the arbitral tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction, and the awards had to be vacated. The District Court denied 
 
 50.  Kathryn Khamsi & Jose Alvarez, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into 
the Heart of the Investment Regime, Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008/2009 379, 440 (2009). 
 51.  Id. at 426. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  BG Grp. PLC. v. Republic of Arg., UNCITRAL, Final Award (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www.ita 
law.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf. 
 54.  Id. ¶ 444. 
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Argentina’s claims and confirmed the award, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reversed that ruling. The question before the U.S. 
Supreme Court was, then, whether a U.S. court should review the arbitrators’ 
interpretation de novo or with the deference that courts ordinarily grant to 
arbitral decisions. 
The Supreme Court framed the issue as a standard commercial arbitration 
issue. For the Court, “as a general matter, a treaty is a contract, though between 
nations,”55 and, building from that mindset, it deferred to the international 
tribunal’s decision. In this contractual approach, the eighteen-months 
requirement could not be read as a condition for Argentina’s consent, but 
rather as a mere procedural requirement. As a result, the tribunal did have 
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court adopted a deferential standard toward its 
decision, overturning the Court of Appeals decision to let the investment award 
stand. In this case, the private framing of the issue led to the allocation of 
authority at the international level. 
C. Standards of Review in a Public Mindset of Investment Arbitration 
Those who consider investment arbitration an issue of public governance 
have questioned Alvarez’s interpretation. The public-law mindset of investment 
arbitration emerged as a reaction to the impacts that such exercise of authority 
was having in local politics and global governance, which remained unchecked. 
The public-law mindset accordingly sought to inject public-law values into 
investment arbitration. Some scholars considered investment arbitration a form 
of global governance that should be subject to global administrative law 
principles,56 such as transparency, participation, and the duty to give reasons, 
while others saw the need to develop a global constitutionalist framework.57 Still 
others saw in investment arbitration the materials to distill, in an exercise of 
comparative law, common public-law principles, which would form the common 
core of investment protection.58 All these approaches share the view that 
investment arbitration was not a mere dispute-settlement mechanism, as the 
private mindset would have it, but rather an actual exercise of global power that 
had to be regulated accordingly. 
The public-law mindset was not only a scholarly concern, but it also had 
important policy implications (involving, for example, an editorial by The New 
 
 55.  BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014). 
 56.  Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 10, at 122; Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 8, at 50–53.  
 57.  See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009) (arguing 
that requirements of the fair-and-equitable-treatment standard, such as transparency and impartiality, 
may amount to a substantive legal framework to control arbitrariness). 
 58.  STEPHAN SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
(2009) (suggesting that common standards of investment protection can be found through a public 
comparative public-law exercise, through which basic principles of investment law are distilled and 
concretized from a wide variety of arbitral awards and other legal materials).   
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York Times).59 The public dimension of investment arbitration was even 
accepted by arbitrators themselves,60 most notably regarding the right of civil 
society to participate before investment tribunals, which has become available 
during the last decade.61 
Adopting a public mindset of investment arbitration has an impact on the 
standard of review. The public nature of investment arbitration implies that the 
standard of review should be deferential to the domestic decisionmaker, thus 
scaling authority down. It is true, though, that the public mindset might 
accommodate varying degrees of deference toward the local decisionmaker.62 
However, it does feature a difference of essence, not of degree, with the private 
mindset. The public approach understands investment arbitration as an exercise 
of public authority. It therefore makes sense that such authority is exercised 
locally. This may not always be possible (hence the varying degrees of 
deference that can be accommodated in the public mindset), and sometimes 
authority needs to be scaled up. Such is the definition of subsidiarity, a 
rebuttable presumption for the local, as put forward in this issue’s 
introduction.63 However, the normative guideline for the public mindset is that 
authority should be exercised as closely as possible to the polity that is being 
affected. As a result, national authorities should have the first say on issues that 
concern investment arbitration, and only exceptionally should authority be 
scaled up. The private mindset, in contrast, features no such normative 
guideline. 
Paradoxically, then, as was the case in the private mindset, politics is also the 
key variable that explains the demand for subsidiarity in the public mindset. 
While the demand for subsidiarity in the private mindset was low, because the 
goal was to isolate decisionmaking from local politics, in the public mindset the 
demand for subsidiarity is high, precisely because the goal is to inject 
decisionmaking into the legitimacy of local politics. 
Perhaps the clearest contrast can be found in the Argentinean gas cases, in 
which William Burke-White and Anne-Marie Slaughter served as expert 
witnesses for the defendant, arguing among other points that the NPM clause 
was indeed self-judging, and that the investment tribunal should therefore 
review domestic decisions under a deferential standard of review, such as good 
faith.64 That argument was rejected by the investment tribunals in the CMS,65 
 
 59.  See Editorial, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/09/27/opinion/the-secret-trade-courts.html?_r=0. 
 60.  See Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 49 (Jan. 15 2001), http://www.italaw 
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0517_0.pdf.  
 61.  See RENÉ URUEÑA, NO CITIZENS HERE: GLOBAL SUBJECTS AND PARTICIPATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 176–99 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2012). 
 62.  See Roberts, supra note 34, at 175–76. 
 63.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 6.  
 64.  See Sempra, Opinion of William Burke-White and Anne-Marie Slaughter, (July 19, 2005), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0993.pdf.  
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Sempra,66 and Enron67 cases. One part of the reasoning was accepted, however, 
in other awards also related to the Argentinean situation. 
In LG&E v. Argentina,68 which features facts virtually identical to CMS, the 
tribunal rejected the idea that the NPM clauses were self-judging and engaged 
in a substantive review of the necessity of the measure. In contrast with CMS, 
though, the tribunal found that the measures were necessary.69 The tribunal 
engaged in such a substantive review on the basis that the text of treaty did not 
provide for the self-judging character of the clause. LG&E was, however, 
slightly more deferential to Argentinean policy choices than the CMS, Sempra, 
and Enron cases. Although the tribunal rejected the self-judging argument, it 
left the door open for a deferential standard of review, specifically good faith.70 
This line of reasoning was further developed in Continental Casualty,71 yet 
another Argentinean case. In the case, the claimant, an American insurer who 
owned an important stake in the leading provider in Argentina of workers’ 
compensation insurance, was also affected by emergency measures. Argentina 
argued the necessity defense, also based on an expert testimony by Anne-Marie 
Slaughter. In line with CMS, the tribunal found that the NPM was not self-
judging; however, it found that if the treaty had clearly established this 
possibility, then authority would have to be scaled downward, in deference to 
the national institution.72 
The Continental Casualty award uses the WTO  Article XX test of necessity 
in order to discuss Argentina’s defense. This standard proves more amenable to 
Argentina’s claims. Unlike prior awards, which deemed Argentina’s measures 
unnecessary if any alternative measure was available, the standard in 
Continental Casualty required that the alternative measure be reasonably 
available to Argentina in achieving its goals.73 Under this standard, the tribunal 
held that Argentina’s measures were necessary under the treaty. Thus, despite 
its rejection of the self-judging argument, by importing the WTO standard, 
Continental Casualty adopted a standard of review that was more deferential to 
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The public mindset suggests that investment arbitration is not merely a 
system of settling private disputes and should accordingly adopt a deferential 
standard of review. Such is the first doctrinal expression of subsidiarity in 
investment arbitration. An alternative justification for scaling authority down, 
which has been suggested by public-minded scholars, but has not been 
developed by tribunals, is the margin of appreciation. Some suggest that 
importing this doctrine from the European Court of Human Rights would best 
suit the peculiar circumstances of investor–state arbitration and the limited 
capacities of ad hoc tribunals before the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes.74 For them, national authorities are better positioned 
than an international arbitral tribunal, both in terms of expertise and domestic 
embeddedness, to engage in an explicit balancing between the rights and 
interests at stake.75 For this reason, “the margin of appreciation allows a 
tribunal to set an appropriate space within which national authorities are able 
to take regulatory action without a tribunal second-guessing those decisions or 
acting in a legislative capacity.”76 
D. Domestic Judicial Review of Investment Awards 
The public mindset can be glimpsed in debate around the BG Group 
decision, both in the dissenting vote of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, and in the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae. In his dissenting opinion, 
Chief Justice Roberts rejects the commercial arbitration framework adopted by 
the majority and underscores the fact that a treaty is not a contract, but rather, 
an agreement between two sovereign nations.77 The dissenting opinion clearly 
underscores the public dimension of the dispute. For Chief Justice Roberts, “It 
is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation to subject itself to suit by private 
parties; we do not presume that any country—including our own—takes that 
step lightly.”78 
Chief Justice Roberts is emphatic that his line of reasoning does not derive 
solely from the fact that the instrument at hand is a treaty. The bilateral 
investment treaty should be read as a standing offer to arbitrate by the host 
state. If the investor fulfills the requirements put forward in that offer, then the 
arbitration agreement is concluded. For the dissenting opinion, the condition 
that BG failed to fulfill was not a mere procedural requirement, but a condition 
of consent to arbitration.79 Consequently, whether an investor has complied 
with that requirement is a question a domestic court must decide de novo, 
 
 74.  Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 3, at 323. 
 75.  Id. at 337. 
 76.  Id. Another alternative, suggested by Stephan Schill, is to adopt a standard of review based on 
the notion of separation of powers. From this perspective, the appropriate standard of review can be 
distilled from a “comparative public law exercise.” Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 593 (2012). 
 77.  BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1215 (2014) (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
 78.  Id. at 1219. 
 79.  Id. at 1218. 
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rather than an issue for the arbitrator to decide subject only to the most 
deferential judicial review.80 Moreover, since the requirement was one of local 
remedies, the dissenting opinion sees “no reason to think that arbitrators enjoy 
comparative expertise in construing the local litigation requirement.”81 As a 
result, the dissenting opinion would have remanded the award to the lower 
court for it to engage in a de novo review of the award.82 The public framing of 
the issue seems to point, though in a less clear fashion than the other examples, 
to a less deferential standard of review of the international award and to a 
preference for a vertical allocation of authority at the national level. 
V 
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DISTINCTION AND THE 
ROLE OF DEFERENCE IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
This article argues that the demand for subsidiarity is a function of the 
public–private divide in investment law. Tribunals and scholars with a public-
law mindset favor allocating authority at the domestic level. Further, they favor 
a deferential standard when investment tribunals review domestic decisions and 
a nondeferential standard when domestic courts review investment awards. In 
contrast, tribunals and scholars with a private-law mindset favor allocating 
authority at the international level. They favor a nondeferential standard for 
investment tribunals and deferential standards for domestic courts. Thus the 
investment arbitration case underscores the importance of the public–private 
distinction for the overall discussion of subsidiarity in global governance. The 
relation can be mapped in the following way: 
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 80.  Id. at 1221. 
 81.  Id. at 1223. 
 82.  Id. at 1224. 
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Such a sharp division between the public and private nature of investment 
arbitration, though, seems untenable. Investment arbitration is fully public—an 
aspect of the regime acknowledged by neither the private nor the public 
mindsets explored here. The private rights that are recognized by the investor 
and the private arbitral procedure are expressions of public power: they are 
created, defined, guaranteed, enforced, and adjudicated by public power.83 In 
that sense, investment arbitration is not public because it exceptionally involves 
public interests such as national security or the environment. It is public 
because there are, in fact, no purely private matters involved: all matters, 
including the rights of the investor, are expressions of public power. If 
understood in this way, purely private commercial arbitration is also public, in 
the sense that it is also created by the power of the state. The distinction, in this 
sense, is trivial, and it may obscure more than it enlightens. Because the whole 
area of purely private arbitration can be understood as public power, the 
distinction easily collapses.84 
The fact that the investment regime is fully public implies a general 
assessment of its role in the distribution of entitlements. Foreign investment 
law, both substantive and procedural, established a set of rules that allows for a 
certain form of bargain between the investor and the state. It gives to the 
investor certain powers, and to the state other powers, thus defining the frontier 
of possibilities of their interaction. In this context, the crucial issue regarding 
the demand for subsidiarity in investment arbitration stops being the 
appropriate level of deference and becomes how a level of deference constitutes 
entitlements in the overarching bargain between investors, states, and civil 
society. Who was given a stronger position in the bargain table when the CMS 
tribunal decided to apply a nondeferential standard of review?  Who would be 
given a weaker position at the table through importing the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine? Thinking of investment arbitration as fully public, all the 
way down, implies that subsidiarity is not only a form of vertically allocating 
power between different levels of governance. It is also a form of horizontally 
distributing power between different actors engaged in the overall bargain of 
foreign investment: states, investors, and civil society. 
But, even if the public–private distinction easily collapses, the demand for 
subsidiarity is still hinged on its currency. The distribution of entitlements 
through public power is not the focus of the public-law mindset of investment 
arbitration. On the contrary, this mindset builds on the notion that there are, 
indeed, some private interests in investment arbitration (for example, the right 
of the investor) that are in principle outside the discussion of public law. Only 
when they collide with public values do they become relevant for a public law 
 
 83.  For a similar argument regarding private property, see generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and 
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470–94 (1923). 
 84.  See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1349, 1357 (1982). 
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analysis. The public-law mindset of investment arbitration reaffirms the public–
private distinction—despite the fact that the whole system is fully public, it still 
reinforces the idea that there are private rights that are outside the public 
sphere that are in principle autonomous from public interests. 
Much scholarly effort is invested in arguing that investment arbitration is a 
public system of governance, but this effort builds on the very idea that that 
there are, indeed, purely private areas of investment law to begin with. This 
premise seems questionable and indeed has been questioned through a 
longstanding tradition of critique of the public–private distinction.85 Specifically, 
contemporary scholarly interventions that reify the inherent nature of a public 
or private governance, by speaking of new “hybrid” governance86 or by trying 
perpetuate the distinction as a desirable “regulative” idea,87 must be questioned 
because the difference obscures important dynamics of power and, specifically, 
hides the important role of public power in supposedly purely private bargains. 
Instead, the public–private division and its effects in terms of subsidiarity 
should be explored from the perspective of the stability of the overall system. 
The vertical allocation of authority, derived as it is from the public–private 
divide, works in investment arbitration as a pressure-relief valve; it allows the 
investment regime to react to the external criticism by reshifting authority down 
to the local level or by scaling it up to the international level, thus allowing for 
deep change while remaining overall stable. 
 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1423 (1982). 
 86.  See Lorenzo Casini, ‘Down the Rabbit Hole’: The Projection of the Public/Private Distinction 
Beyond the State 5 (Jean Monnet Working Paper, Paper No. 8, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349841&download=yes.   
 87.  Matthias Goldmann, A Matter of Perspective: Global Governance and the Distinction between 
Public and Private Authority (and Not Law), (Jan. 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2260293. 
